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I. Introduction 
 The 1980s were a decade of tax reform across OECD countries.  The changes had many 
common themes.  Top rates of personal income tax and rates of corporate income tax fell, but 
revenues were maintained by broadening the bases of these taxes.  Seven countries introduced a 
value-added tax.  Many countries that already had a VAT increased its rate.  Social security 
contributions were increased in many countries.  These changes are explored in the first part of this 
report, which looks at trends in the total tax burden, changes in the structure of tax systems and 
specific reforms to personal and corporate income taxes, social security contributions and VAT.   
 But the magnitude of past tax changes does not mean interest in tax reform has come to an 
end.  First, many of the tax reforms failed fully to achieve their objectives: tax systems continue to 
distort economic decisions, they remain complex and the tax burden continues to rise.  Secondly, 
some tax reforms may have had undesirable side effects, for example, on the distribution of income 
or the tax burden on labour.  Thirdly, the agenda for tax reform has expanded to include issues such 
as environmental taxes, the communications revolution and commercial growth of the Internet and 
the relationships between taxation, investment, economic growth and jobs.  And the G7, OECD 
and European Union are committed to addressing international tax issues, especially the extent of 
harmful tax competition.  These issues are covered in the second part of the report, while the final 
part concludes.   
 
II. Motives for tax reform  
 There was a number of economic and political driving forces behind tax reforms in the 
1980s and early 1990s.   
 First, the range of economic changes usually summed up in the term „globalisation‟.  As 
capital has become more internationally mobile, countries find it more difficult to sustain high tax 
rates, particularly if multinationals are important to their economy.  Globalisation also favours 
taxes where the location of the tax base is readily identifiable — such as consumption or labour 
income — over bases which are difficult to pin down, such as profits.  But the effect of capital 
mobility has often been overstated: as shown below, there is no evidence of globalisation affecting 
overall levels of taxation.   
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 The falling cost of information technology, especially compared with the expense of tax 
inspectors, accountants and lawyers, means that it is cheaper to collect taxes on easily-identifiable 
transactions, such as labour income and consumption, compared with capital income.   
 Governments also began to recognise that expensive tax breaks had become entrenched 
and had outlived their original purpose or, at worst, were counter-productive.  A more neutral tax 
system would reduce the economic distortions from collecting taxes and so lead to a more efficient 
economy.  But interest groups, of course, continued to lobby for tax breaks for economically or 
socially desirable things such as research and development or „the family‟.    
 Partly as a result of such tax breaks, but also because of necessarily ever more 
sophisticated anti-avoidance activity, tax systems continued to become more complex.  
„Taxpayers‟ rights‟ movements and pressure for simplification were common.  In some cases, an 
important political motive was to reverse the redistributive policy followed in the past.   
 Finally, a number of governments were elected on promises to cut the tax burden and to 
„roll back the frontiers of the state‟, that is to reduce the size of the public sector.  But in these 
countries and others, a growing public sector and a desire to reduce budget deficits meant more tax 
revenues were needed, and the discussion of tax reform begins with this issue.   
 
  
III. A growing tax burden 
 Despite efforts to halt or reverse the long-term increase in taxes in many countries, the total 
tax burden across the OECD has continued to rise: rose from 34 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 37 per 
cent in 1990 and to 38½ per cent in 1994.  The tax burden fell between 1980 and 1994 only in 
Luxembourg, Norway and the United Kingdom.  It rose in every other OECD country.  But the 
rate of increase in the 1980s and early 1990s was only half that of the 1970s, as can be seen in 
Figure 1.  
Figure 1.  Taxes as a percentage of GDP in OECD countries, 1965-94 
 
 Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 
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 Although trends may have been similar, significant differences remain in total tax 
revenues between countries behind the average in Figure 1.  Table 1 shows that Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway take over 45 per cent of GDP in taxes, 
compared with less than 30 per cent in Australia, Japan and the United States.  The main reason for 
the difference in tax burdens is, of course, the difference in the size of the public sector.  This is 
shown by the second column in Table 1: total government spending.   
Table 1.  Taxes and government spending as a percentage of GDP, 1993 
 Total taxes Total spending 
Denmark 49.9 56.8 
Sweden 49.9 72.5 
Netherlands 48.0 55.3 
Italy 47.8 56.9 
Norway 45.7 50.9 
Belgium 45.7 56.8 
Finland 45.7 60.2 
Luxembourg 44.6  
France 43.9 55.0 
Austria 43.6 53.2 
Greece 41.2 46.9 
Germany 39.0 49.6 
Ireland 36.3 42.8 
Canada 35.7 49.4 
New Zealand 35.6  
Spain 35.1 47.6 
United Kingdom 33.6 43.6 
Switzerland 33.2  
Portugal 31.4 45.0 
Iceland 31.3  
United States 29.7 34.5 
Japan 29.1 34.3 
Australia 28.7 37.6 
Turkey 23.5  
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics and OECD Economies at a Glance: Structural Indicators 
 
 
IV. Changing tax structures 
 Changing the tax mix — usually involving a shift from the personal income tax to general 
consumption taxes, like VAT — was a theme of a number of tax reforms in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Switching to consumption taxes can increase the incentive to save by reducing the difference 
between pre- and post-tax returns on savings.  Consumption taxes may be less easy to avoid and 
evade than income taxes.   
 It is also widely held that such a switch would improve work incentives, as net earnings are 
increased for a given level of gross pay.  For example, The Economist has said: “the plan to extend 
VAT is good economics.  Indirect taxes area more efficient way to raise revenue than direct taxes 
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because they do not weaken the incentive to work.”  But this is nonsense: direct taxes cut 
disposable incomes and so the amount of goods and services that can be bought for a given supply 
of labour.  Indirect taxes reduce the real value of incomes, and so the amount of goods and services 
that can be bought for a given supply of labour.  Neither or both might have an incentive effect, but 
this cannot be true for one and not the other.   
 There is also a number of concerns with general consumption taxes.  They are usually less 
progressive than the personal income tax, imposing a larger tax burden on lower income taxpayers.  
Partly this is because higher income families tend to save more, and so will bear general 
consumption taxes in the future when the money is spent.  But this is not picked up in 
income-distribution analyses.  Many countries attempt to increase the progressivity of their general 
consumption tax by putting lower or zero rates on „necessities‟: goods which form a 
disproportionately large part of the budgets of poor families.  But this can generate economic 
inefficiency by distorting consumer choices between high- and low-taxed goods and services.  
General consumption taxes have faced significant political opposition in many countries: in 
Australia, Canada and Japan, there has been strong taxpayer resistance to the proposal or 
introduction of general consumption taxes.  Introducing a general consumption tax imposes a 
significant one-off burden of administrative and compliance costs.  It also has an immediate 
upward effect on inflation.
2
   Table 2 shows that there has been a shift to general consumption 
taxes.  During the 1960s and 1970s, that this was mainly at the expense of other taxes on goods and 
services (such as excise duties).  More recently, there have been smaller falls in personal and 
corporate income taxes.  In the 1980s, revenues a proportion of GDP rose 34 per cent for general 
consumption taxes and 26 per cent for social security.  Personal income taxes‟ share of GDP fell by 
6 per cent.   
 The countries that saw the biggest changes are Greece, New Zealand and Turkey when 
they introduced general consumption taxes.  In the last two cases, this was accompanied by 
substantial cuts in personal income tax.  For example, in New Zealand between 1985 and 1994, the 
goods-and-service tax‟s share of total revenues rose from 10 to 22 per cent, while the personal 
income tax fell from 60 to 45 per cent.  In Japan, general consumption tax revenues have 
substituted for corporate income taxes, whose revenue share fell from 21 per cent in 1985 to 15 per 
cent in 1994.  Canada saw a similar sharp decline in corporate tax revenues.  Social security 
contributions rose there and in Finland and Japan.  Spain has used general consumption taxes to 
reduce the role of social security contributions.  Finally, the United Kingdom also increased the 
rate and extended the base of VAT significantly: between 1975 and 1994 its share rose from 9 to 20 
per cent of revenues.   
 The averages given in Table 2, as with the total tax burden in Figure 1, disguise significant 
differences between countries in the structure of their tax systems.  Table 3 shows countries that 
collect proportionally the most and the least under the four main heads of taxes: personal and 
corporate income, social security and general consumption.  The OECD average figures are given 
for comparison.  Countries that stand out in the Table include Australia, which has no social 
security contributions and low levels of consumption taxation, relying on corporate and personal 
income taxes.  Again, New Zealand has no social security contributions, but high levels of general 
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consumption and personal income taxation.  France and Germany, in contrast, have the highest 
social security contributions but collect little in personal and corporate income tax respectively.   
 
Table 2.  Structure of taxation in OECD countries  
(per cent of total revenue) 
Type of tax 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 
Personal income  26 28 31 32 30 30 28 
Corporate income 9 9 8 7 8 8 8 
Social security 19 21 25 25 25 25 27 
Property 8 7 6 5 5 5 5 
General consumption 12 13 13 14 16 17 18 
Other goods and services 24 22 17 17 16 15 14 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 
 
Table 3.  Structure of taxation in OECD countries  
(per cent of total revenue) 
Personal income Corporate income Social security General consumption 
Denmark   52 Luxembourg  16 France   45 Iceland   32 
Australia   41 Japan   15 Germany   39 Turkey   24 
New Zealand 45 Australia   13 Netherlands  38 New Zealand 23 
Average   29 Average     7 Average   26 Average   17 
Portugal   20 Germany     4 Denmark     3 Switzerland    8 
France   14 Austria     4 Australia     0 United States   8 
Greece     9 Iceland     3 New Zealand   0 Japan     5 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 
 
 
V. Personal income tax: top rates cut 
 Governments have dealt with one aspect of the growing tax burden evidenced in Figure 1: 
the upward creep in top marginal rates of personal income tax.  High rates, over 70 per cent in 
some cases, are distortionary, providing a disincentive to work and save and an incentive to use tax 
loopholes, reducing the tax take in practice.  In 20 countries — the only exception being Turkey 
with a very low marginal rate to start with — top marginal rates have been cut recently, by an 
average of 12 percentage points (Table 4).  But the vast majority of these cuts were in the late 
1980s, and top rates have tended to remain stable in the 1990s.  Previous cuts have been partially 
reversed in Canada, Iceland, Italy, Sweden and the United States.   
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Table 4.  Top marginal rates of central 
government personal income tax 
 1986 1990 1995 
Australia 57 47 47 
Austria 62 50 50 
Belgium 72 55 55 
Canada 34 29 31.3 
Denmark 45 40 34.5 
Finland 51 43 39 
France 65 57 56.8 
Germany 56 53 53 
Greece 63 50 40 
Iceland 38.5 33 38.15 
Ireland 58 53 48 
Italy 62 50 51 
Japan 70 50 50 
Luxembourg 57 56 50 
Netherlands 72 60 60 
New Zealand 57 33 33 
Norway 40 20 13.7 
Portugal 61 40 40 
Spain 66 56 56 
Sweden 50 20 25 
Switzerland 13 13 11.5 
Turkey 50 50 55 
United Kingdom 60 40 40 
United States 50 28 39.6 
Source: OECD Tax Database 
Note: Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United States also have 
personal income tax levied by sub-central 
government.   
 
VI. Personal income tax: a broader base 
 While top rates of personal income tax have come down, revenues have not fallen 
anywhere near as sharply as the figures in Table 4 would suggest.  In 1994, revenues were 10.7 per 
cent of GDP across the OECD, compared with 11.3 per cent in 1980.  The reason is that many 
governments financed rate cuts by broadening the base of the tax.   
 Taxes on fringe benefits were increased in Australia, Finland, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom and the deductibility of mortgage interest payments was limited in Finland, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom.  The 1986 reform in the United States removed a range of deductions.   
 In addition to financing cuts in tax rates, this base broadening in many cases removed 
complex features of the tax system and reduced distortions to consumption, saving and work 
decisions.  An important part of the assault on tax privileges is tax expenditure accounts.  14 
OECD countries now produce these reports, which estimate revenues foregone from tax 
concessions.  Australia, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal all 
began producing tax expenditure accounts in the 1980s (OECD, 1996d).  
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 Cuts in top rates of income tax were not wholly financed by broader income tax base, and 
in many countries the tax burden at lower levels of income rose.  These distributional concerns are 
addressed in section XI below.  
 
VII. A flatter income tax 
 As well as cutting top rates of income tax, many countries have reduced the number of 
income tax brackets.  This is perhaps one of the only areas in which tax systems became simpler 
during the 1980s.  Fewer marginal rates need not make the income tax less progressive (i.e. the 
proportion of income paid in tax increases with income).  Most of the progressivity of the income 
tax derives from the fact that the first slice of income is free of tax, due to zero-rate bands, 
allowances or general tax credits.  But fewer marginal rates do make taxes simpler, for example, 
when trying to deduct tax from different income sources.  Table 5 shows that 16 countries cut the 
number of schedule rates in the late 1980s.  The average number of rates fell from over 10 to below 
6.  But during the 1990s, while France, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg have simplified their tax 
schedules, previous simplifications have been reversed in Canada, Denmark, Iceland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  Tables 4 and 5 show that in the 1980s, and to a limited extent in 
the 1990s, the personal income tax became a flatter tax.   
 
Table 5.  Number of positive rates in central government  
personal income tax schedule, 1986, 1990 and 1995 
 1986 1990 1995 
Australia 5 4 4 
Austria 10 5 5 
Belgium 12 7 7 
Canada 10 3 4 
Denmark 3 3 4 
Finland 11 6 6 
France 12 12 6 
Greece 18 9 3 
Iceland 3 1 2 
Ireland 3 3 2 
Italy 9 7 7 
Japan 15 5 5 
Luxembourg 21 24 17 
Netherlands 9 3 3 
New Zealand 6 2 2 
Norway 8 2 2 
Spain 34 16 16 
Sweden 10 1 1 
Switzerland 6 6 13 
Turkey 6 6 7 
United Kingdom 6 2 3 
United States 14 2 5 
Source: OECD Tax Database 
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VIII. The rise of VAT 
 The main reason for the growth in general consumption tax revenues shown in Table 2 was 
the substitution of VAT for retail and wholesale sales taxes.  Currently, Australia and the United 
States are the only OECD countries without a VAT-type tax.  Greece, Spain and Portugal 
introduced VAT in the 1980s when they joined the European Union (this is a condition of 
membership).  Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland have also recently 
introduced a VAT.  A second reason for the growth of general consumption taxes has been the 
tendency for rates of VAT to rise once the tax is introduced.  The average rate of VAT when 
countries first introduced the tax is 12½ per cent; the average in 1996 is 17½ per cent.  Table 6 
charts the rise of VAT. 
 
Table 6.  VAT in OECD countries 
 Year VAT 
introduced 
Initial 
standard rate 
Current 
standard rate 
Austria 1973 16 20 
Belgium 1971 18 21 
Canada 1991 7 7 
Denmark 1967 10 25 
Finland 1969 11.1 22 
France 1964 20 20.6 
Germany 1968 10 15 
Greece 1987 16 18 
Iceland 1989 22 24.5 
Ireland 1972 16.4 21 
Italy 1973 12 19 
Japan 1989 3 5 
Luxembourg 1970 8 15 
Mexico 1960 10 15 
Netherlands 1969 12 17.5 
New Zealand 1986 10 12.5 
Norway 1970 20 23 
Portugal 1986 16 17 
Spain 1986 12 16 
Sweden 1969 11.1 25 
Switzerland 1995 6.5 6.5 
Turkey 1985 10 15 
United Kingdom 1973 10 17.5 
Source: OECD Consumption Tax Trends 
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IX. Social security contributions 
 A second trend evident in Table 2 is the growth in social security contributions, so that by 
1994 they nearly raised as much as the personal income tax.  Indeed, in the majority of OECD 
countries (16), more was raised from social security than from the personal income tax.  This shift 
probably reflects the growing pressures on social security expenditure from higher levels of 
unemployment, the ageing of the population and other social changes, such as an increase in the 
number of lone parents.  These extra benefits must be financed, either through higher social 
security contribution rates or through broader financing of benefits.   
 In some countries, increases in the value of social security benefits also added to the 
pressure.  For example, the value of unemployment benefits increased significantly relative to 
earnings during the 1980s in Finland, France, Greece, Norway and Portugal.  Only in Belgium, 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States did benefit levels fall relative to earnings 
in the 1980s (OECD, 1994, chapter 8).   
 
X. Corporate income tax 
 Trends in the corporate income tax have followed the personal income tax: the tax base has 
been broadened and rates reduced.  Various incentive schemes have been limited or abolished in 
Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United States, 
including schemes for particular regions or sectors, investment credits and property-related 
tax-shelters.  Depreciation for tax purposes has been brought more closely in line with economic 
depreciation (Table 8).  Table 7 shows that the cuts in central government corporate income tax 
since the mid-1980s average around ten percentage points.  
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Table 7.  Basic rates of corporate income tax 
of central government, 1986-95 
 1986 1991 1995 
Australia 49 39 33 
Austria 30 30 34 
Belgium 45 39 39 
Canada 36 29 29 
Denmark 50 38 34 
Finland 33 23 25 
France 45 34/42 33 
Germany 56 50/36 45/30 
Greece 49 46 35/40 
Iceland 51 45 33 
Ireland 50 43 40 
Italy 36 36 36 
Japan 43 38 38 
Luxembourg 40 33 33 
Netherlands 42 35 35 
New Zealand 45 33 33 
Norway 28 27 19 
Portugal 42/47 36 36 
Spain 35 35 35 
Sweden 52 30 28 
Switzerland 4-10 4-10 4-10 
Turkey 46 49 25 
United Kingdom 35 34 33 
United States 46 34 35 
Source: OECD (1991) and OECD Tax Database 
Note: Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland and the 
United States also have sub-central corporate 
taxes.  Rates rounded to nearest percentage point.  
Many countries also have special rates for firms 
with fewer profits and for particular sectors.  Where 
two rates are shown this indicates a ‘split-rate’ 
system, with separate rates for dividends and 
retained earnings.  
 
 Table 8 shows one aspect of base broadening in the corporate income tax.  The Table 
shows the net present value of depreciation allowances for buildings and for plant and machinery.  
A figure of 100 per cent indicates the most generous treatment: all investment expenditure can be 
offset against tax liabilities immediately.  In most cases, however, the investment must be offset 
over time, and so the net present value of the allowance (calculated at a 10 per cent discount rate) is 
less than 100 per cent.   
 The Table shows that Canada, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States cut 
their depreciation allowances in the 1980s and early 1990s.  The overall average fell by around 10 
percentage points for both types of investment.   
 
 11 
Table 8.  Net present value of depreciation allowances, 1985-94 
(per cent) 
 Buildings  Plant and machinery 
 1980 1985 1990 1994  1980 1985 1990 1994 
Australia 0 32 20 32  71 78 71 73 
Canada 35 33 24 24  94 89 73 73 
France 38 38 38 38  81 87 81 81 
Germany 26 49 49 49  76 80 80 80 
Ireland 100 100 73 32  100 100 74 71 
Italy 67 67 38 38  84 84 76 76 
Japan 29 30 30 30  70 70 70 70 
Spain 46 49 45 54  73 76 72 70 
United Kingdom 91 51 32 32  100 87 73 73 
United States 43 56 26 21  87 87 78 78 
Source: Chennells and Griffith (1997).  
 
XI. Tax reform and the distribution of income 
 Figure 2 shows one reason for concern with the effect of tax reforms in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  The white bars show the average tax rate (i.e. personal income tax and social security 
contributions as a percentage of earnings) at two-thirds of average earnings.  The grey bars show 
the average tax rates at double average earnings.  The difference between the grey and the white 
bars shows how progressive the tax system is.  For each country, the upper bar shows the situation 
in 1978, the lower in 1992.  In Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and France, taxes have risen 
across the board, but have risen more steeply on those with lower earnings.  In Norway and 
Sweden, taxes have fallen for all groups, but the falls for those on lower incomes are less than for 
higher earners.  Finally, in Germany and the United States, the tax burden on those low down the 
earnings' distribution has risen, but fallen for higher earners.  In these countries, individual direct 
taxes have become less progressive.   
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Figure 2.  Personal income tax and employees’ social security contributions 
as a percentage of earnings, single persons earning  
67 and 200 per cent of average, 1978 and 1992 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
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Source: The OECD Jobs Study: Taxation, Employment and Unemployment.  
 
 The result of these changes is that the distribution of net income is widening in a number of 
OECD countries.  In the United Kingdom and the United States, the distribution of before-tax 
income has been widening, partly because of higher unemployment and ageing of the population 
and partly because of a wider gap between low and high earnings from employment.  The change 
in the structure of taxation, with a greater part of the burden borne by those on low incomes means 
that the change in the after-tax distribution of income is even greater.   
 Table 9 shows how the distribution of the tax burden between different income groups 
varies in a number of OECD countries.  The incomes of the population have been ranked from the 
lowest to the highest, and the population divide into fifths, or quintiles.  The first column of the 
table shows the percentage of the total direct tax burden (including personal income tax and 
employees‟ social security contributions) paid by the poorest fifth of the population, the last 
column, the proportion paid by the richest fifth.  In Australia and the United States, the poorest 
60 per cent of the population pay around a quarter of total taxes, followed by Canada and the United 
Kingdom where this portion is around 28.5 per cent.  The highest figures are in Ireland, Norway, 
the Netherlands and Sweden, where around 36 per cent of total taxes are paid by the poorest 60 per 
cent.  These figures probably result from the differences in the pre-tax income distribution.  In 
North America and the United Kingdom the distribution of pre-tax incomes is much broader than 
the relatively equal distributions of the Nordic countries.  Thus, even if taxes were equally 
progressive in the two groups of countries, the percentage of taxes paid by poorer groups would be 
lower if the income distribution is wider.   
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Table 9.  Percentage of total taxes paid  
Income quintile: 1 2 3 4 5 
Australia 0.7 7.6 16.3 24.2 51.2 
Canada 3.6 8.8 16.2 24.8 46.5 
Finland 4.9 11.2 17.1 23.9 42.9 
Germany 5.5 10.4 17.0 23.4 43.7 
Ireland 7.0 12.2 17.6 23.8 39.3 
Netherlands 10.3 10.0 16.2 22.3 41.2 
Norway 3.7 13.2 19.2 25.7 38.1 
Sweden 6.3 12.5 17.7 23.3 40.1 
United Kingdom 4.5 8.1 15.9 25.0 46.4 
United States 3.8 6.9 13.9 22.6 52.7 
Source: OECD (1995).   
Note: Income quintiles ranked from poorest (1) to richest (5).   
 
XII. Taxes and unemployment 
 The OECD Jobs Study concluded that the high level of unemployment is the unfortunate 
result of societies' failure to adapt to a world of rapid change and intensified global competition.  
Most people in industrialised countries have a clear, immediate financial incentive to work.  But 
such incentives are lacking for a significant minority — particularly those with low potential 
earnings — and people will be reluctant to work if work does not pay.  Tax and benefit systems 
cause three types of labour-market problems
3
 
 The 'unemployment trap', where benefits are high compared with earnings.  Cutting the 
benefits of the unemployed increases the reward to taking a job but the social costs of 
this solution may be unacceptable.   
 The 'poverty trap': low-wage workers have little immediate financial incentive to 
increase hours worked; to work part-time or to invest in education and training to move 
up the wage ladder.   
 Taxes on labour may increase its cost and so discourage employers from hiring and 
reduce employment.   
 Cutting taxes on labour is expensive, even when targeted on low-wage earners.  Such cuts 
will require either a switch to taxes that are not ultimately borne by labour, cuts in public spending 
or redistributing the tax burden onto higher earners.  One area where the tax system bears 
particularly on low-income earners is social security contributions.  Ceilings to contributions mean 
that the marginal tax rate on high earners is zero, but positive on those with low earnings.  
Employers have an incentive to give overtime to existing workers, rather than employ other people.  
Table 10 shows ceilings relative to average earnings in those OECD countries that have them.   
 
                                                     
3
 See OECD (1997).   
 14 
Table 10.  Structure of social security contributions, 
1993  
 Ceilings  
(% average earnings) 
 Employee Employer 
Austria 146 146 
Canada 105 105 
France 131 131 
Germany 169 169 
Greece 212 212 
Ireland 154 164 
Luxembourg 245 245 
Spain 219 219 
Turkey 83 - 
United Kingdom 154 - 
United States 229 229 
Source: OECD (1995b) 
 A second way of using the tax system to make work pay is the use of 
employment-conditional tax credits or benefits, in-work benefits for short.  These increase the 
returns to working by paying a supplement only to those in work.  By withdrawing the tax credit or 
benefit as earnings increase, the benefits are targeted on those with low earnings.  Often the 
schemes are limited to families with children.  Since benefit systems give these groups the largest 
payment out of work, they are further targeted on the groups for which work incentives might be a 
problem.  Examples of such schemes in practice include family credit in the United Kingdom, the 
earned income tax credit in the United States and family income supplement in Ireland.  Evidence 
from the United Kingdom and the United States suggests that these schemes can be effective in 
improving work incentives and encouraging people into employment.  Denmark and Sweden have 
recently investigated the relevance of such as scheme to their labour market (Ministry of Finance, 
1995 and Eriksson, 1997).  Other countries might be expected to follow.   
 
XIII. The scope for green tax reform 
 Scientific evidence emerged in the late 1980s of a range of environmental problems: holes 
in the ozone layer, global warming, health hazards from lead and particulates from motor fuels and 
damage from acid rain.  There is a range of ways in which governments can intervene in response 
— government spending, taxation and regulation — to promote environmentally-friendly 
behaviour, as in other policy areas.  But green taxes have a number of advantages over 
command-and-control methods.  They provide an incentive to reduce pollution in the most 
efficient way.  Moreover, the incentive is continuing, encouraging a flow of new ways of reducing 
pollution.  Finally, unlike regulation, taxes raise revenues, which can be used to cut deficits, 
increase spending or reduce other taxes.  But despite this theory, there have been few successful 
examples of green tax reform.  Table 11 shows the revenues from environmental taxes in three 
countries that have made significant attempts to green their tax systems for 1994.  Receipts amount 
to less than 1 per cent of the total in each case.  Governments have instead resorted to other policy 
measures to achieve environmental goals than direct taxes on pollutants.  In some cases they have 
differentiated existing taxes.  For example, excise duties favour unleaded petrol in 19 countries and 
motor vehicle taxes have been differentiated to favour catalytic converters or fuel-efficient cars.  
Other countries have used command and control.  Austria, for example, has simply banned leaded 
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petrol and CFCs are being phased out throughout the world.  Other countries have used existing 
taxes such as motor fuel duties.  Although these have an environmental impact, they are not pure 
environmental taxes since the tax base is not directly related to the environmental damage caused.   
 The only environmental tax with the potential to raise significant revenues would be a CO2 
tax.  However, there are a number of obstacles to countries wishing to introduce the tax alone, such 
as the effect on competitiveness of domestic industry, and international consensus has not been 
forthcoming.  In some countries that have introduced a CO2 tax it has subsequently been reduced 
or abolished due to competitiveness concerns.  It remains to be seen whether existing measures are 
sufficient to meet countries‟ obligations to stabilise CO2 emissions or whether an international 
agreement to introduce a CO2 tax will be necessary.   
 
Table 11.  Revenues from environmental taxes 
 Revenues 
(per cent of total, 1994) 
Denmark  
CFC 0.001 
CO2 0.658 
Nickel-cadmium batteries 0.002 
Disposable tableware 0.011 
Insecticide 0.002 
Waste 0.119 
Total 0.809 
  
Netherlands  
Air pollution 0.430 
Water pollution 0.007 
Total 0.437 
  
Norway  
CO2 0.714 
 
XIV. Tax distortions and household saving 
 Household savings raise a number of policy concerns.  First, that the pool of savings is too 
small, and that higher levels of savings would boost investment and long-term rates of economic 
growth.  But the OECD (1994b) study concluded that „there is no clear evidence that the level of 
taxation ... does generally affect the level of household saving‟.  Even if tax incentives could be 
used to encourage household saving, there is no reason to expect national saving to increase.  The 
tax revenue the government loses from the incentive cuts public savings and may more than offset 
the increase in household saving.   
 A second concern is the allocation of savings.  In every country, different savings vehicles 
are taxed differently.  The result is that individuals choose savings instruments not on economic 
grounds, like the expected return and risk, but opt for the most fiscally-privileged route. 
 The fundamental difficulty is the definition of income.  There are two benchmarks in 
theory.  An expenditure tax aims to tax consumption in a particular period.  In theory this could be 
achieved with a universal VAT, but in practice, such a tax would be highly regressive and difficult 
to levy on some goods and services so there will always be a role for an income tax.  With respect 
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to savings expenditure-tax treatment can be achieved in two ways.  First, contributions into the 
savings account and the investment returns earned could be exempted from tax, with tax imposed 
when savings are withdrawn.  Second, contributions could be made out of after-tax income, but 
investment returns and withdrawal of savings exempt.  The second benchmark is the 
comprehensive income tax, which taxes both consumption and savings.  This can be implemented 
by taxing both contributions and investment returns or both investment returns and withdrawal of 
savings.  With regard to saving, the expenditure tax is neutral: consumption today and tomorrow is 
taxed at the same rate, whereas the comprehensive income tax discriminates against future 
consumption by taxing it more than current spending.   
 Figure 3 compares the actual tax treatment of four illustrative savings vehicles — a 
pension, housing (bought without a loan), direct purchase of equities and bank deposits.  The 
figure shows marginal effective tax rates (METRs) on savings.  As noted previously, the 
expenditure tax treats savings neutrally, so the METR of an expenditure tax is zero.  The 
comprehensive income tax taxes savings as if they were current consumption.  The METR is 
therefore the statutory marginal rate.  Figure 3 is computed for an individual paying the highest 
marginal tax rate.   
 Comparing different instruments, in four countries — Canada, France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States — pensions have the most generous tax treatment, followed by 
housing and then equity purchase, with bank deposits being the least tax-privileged.  In Germany, 
while pensions have an expenditure tax treatment, housing receives a very large tax subsidy, but 
again, equities and bank deposits have a much less generous tax treatment.  In Japan, pensions are 
taxed heavily, while equity investments have the most generous treatment.   
 Comparing the tax treatment with the two benchmarks, there are a number of examples of 
expenditure tax treatments: pensions in Canada, Germany, Italy and housing and pensions in the 
United States.  Bank deposits are taxed on a comprehensive income tax basis in Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.
4
  But in some cases, the tax treatment lies even outside the range 
of the two benchmarks.  For example housing in Germany and pensions in the United Kingdom are 
tax subsidised.  Deposits in Germany and France are taxed at a higher rate than the comprehensive 
income tax.   
 In all the countries shown, there are enormous differences between the tax treatment of 
different savings instruments.  The effect is to divert savings into the most fiscally-privileged 
assets and away from those which attract a tax penalty.  The net result is that the taxation of savings 
overall tends to move towards that of the most generously-treated savings.  The risk is that by 
choosing savings vehicles because of tax rather than economic characteristics, the market is 
distorted and investment mis-allocated.   
Figure 3.  Effective tax rates on savings, 1994 
                                                     
4
 Although in each case the tax is levied on nominal returns whereas a pure comprehensive income tax would tax only 
real returns.  If inflation were taken into account, then the effective tax rate would be higher than a comprehensive 
income tax. 
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Source: OECD (1994b) 
 
 Some countries have moved to reduce differences between the tax treatment of different 
savings instruments.  Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have implemented the most 
extensive reforms, moving their tax systems towards a flat-rate tax on capital income to varying 
extents.  In Finland, for example, a separate flat tax of 25 per cent was introduced on capital 
income and tax-exempt savings deposits abolished.  In Norway, interest, imputed income from 
owner-occupation, dividends etc. are taxed at a flat 28 per cent.  In Portugal, the tax reform of 1989 
introduced reliefs for retirement and housing savings accounts and stock option plans.   
 In other countries, specific savings incentive schemes have been introduced, often with the 
purpose of moving towards an expenditure tax.  Examples of schemes exempting the interest on 
deposits up to a ceiling include the plan d‟épargne populaire (PEP) and the Livret A accounts in 
France and tax-exempt special savings accounts (TESSAs) in the United Kingdom.  Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain use the simpler approach of exempting a fixed amount of interest income 
from all sources.   
 Various schemes offering limited tax deduction for investment in equities are available in 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway and the 
United Kingdom.  Personal equity plans (PEPs) in the United Kingdom and plans d‟épargne en 
actions (PEA) in France offer exemption from taxation of dividend income and capital gains.   
 Despite recent reforms, most countries still tax different savings instruments at wildly 
different rates.  Expect further moves towards a neutral tax regime either through flat taxes on 
capital income or increased use of tax-exempt savings vehicles.   
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XV. Tax distortions and company investment 
 Reforms to corporate taxation have not eliminated the disincentive to firms to invest and 
the distortions to the way firms finance investment and the form investment takes.  The standard 
way of examining the effects of taxes on investment is to look at „marginal effective tax wedges‟.  
The METW shows the difference between the rate of return before and after tax.  A METW of 
1.2 per cent implies that a return of 11.2 per cent is required before tax to achieve a target after-tax 
return of 10 per cent for the firm.  Table 12 shows METWs for a range of countries and different 
financing arrangements and types of asset.   
 In every country, debt is the most tax efficient form of finance.  For example, the required 
rate of return in Germany is nearly halved due to the deduction of nominal interest payments against 
the relatively high corporate tax rate.  Retained earnings in every case raise the required return, 
because there is no relief like that for interest payments.  In the United States the so-called 
„classical‟ corporation tax gives no relief to shareholders against the taxes paid by the company.  
Retained earnings and new equity have the same tax wedge as a result.  The Australian, Canadian, 
Japanese and Spanish systems have the same effect.  In each of the other countries, there is some 
compensation to shareholders for company-level taxes.  New equity is more generously treated 
than retained earnings.  The compensation method is an „imputation‟ system in France, Ireland, 
Italy and the United Kingdom, and a split-rate system in Germany, where dividend distributions and 
retained earnings are taxed at different rates.   
 Table 12 also shows the tax system tends to favour plant and machinery over buildings and 
buildings over inventories.  The only exceptions in the Table are Spain (where buildings receive 
the most generous treatment) and the United States (where inventory investment is favoured 
relative to buildings.    
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Table 12.  Marginal effective tax wedge by financing and asset, 1994 
 Buildings Plant and 
machinery 
Inventory  Retained 
earnings 
New equity Debt  Average 
Australia 2.4 1.0 4.3  4.2 4.2 -1.8  2.1 
Canada 3.0 1.1 4.5  4.6 4.6 -1.8  2.4 
France 1.2 -0.5 3.5  3.7 -4.0 -2.2  0.8 
Germany 2.4 0.5 4.5  7.0 -3.1 -4.6  1.9 
Ireland 0.4 0.1 0.9  1.0 0.2 -0.5  0.4 
Italy 3.5 1.1 4.5  8.2 -4.3 -4.4  2.5 
Japan 5.4 3.2 5.5  8.6 8.6 -3.5  4.4 
Netherlands 1.8 0.4 2.3  4.0 -0.7 -2.5  1.2 
Spain 1.2 1.4 4.7  4.3 4.3 -2.2  2.0 
United Kingdom 2.0 0.6 3.9  4.2 0.5 -1.8  1.7 
United States 4.4 0.9 3.8  5.4 5.4 -2.9  2.5 
          
Average 2.5 0.9 3.9  5.0 1.4 -2.6  2.0 
Source: Chennells and Griffith (1997).  See also Griffith (1996).   
Note: Marginal effective tax wedge is the difference between the post-tax and pre-tax real rates of return.  
Assuming a 10 per cent post-tax target return, an METW of 1.2 implies that the pre-tax return must be 11.2 
per cent.  Weights, from OECD (1991): buildings 28 per cent, plant and machinery 50 per cent, inventory 22 
per cent; retained earnings 55 per cent, new equity 10 per cent, debt 35 per cent.  Assumes economic 
depreciation of 3.6 per cent for buildings, 12.25 per cent for plant and zero for inventory and inflation of 3.5 
per cent.  
  
 Finally, the last column averages over the different assets and forms of financing to show 
the overall incentive to invest.  The weightings used reflect the OECD-wide average split between 
assets and finance.  In each country there is a disincentive to invest, equivalent to adding 2 per cent 
to the cost of capital to firms.  This varies, however, between 0.4 per cent in Ireland and 4.4 per 
cent in Japan.   
 Table 13 shows how the weighted average METW (the final column of Table 12) has 
varied over the 1980s and 1990s.  In Australia and Germany the wedge has fallen from around 4½ 
per cent to around 2 per cent in both cases.  The METW has also fallen significantly in France.  In 
Ireland and the United Kingdom, the average wedge was negative in 1980 but is now positive in 
both cases.  In other countries, even where substantial reforms have taken place, the wedge has not 
been affected.   
 The majority of the countries analysed in Table 13 have moved towards a more neutral 
system in the 1980s and early 1990s.  In Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, the differences in the wedges between different sources of finance 
and types of investment have become smaller.   
 20 
Table 13.  Overall marginal effective tax wedges, 1980-94 
 1980 1985 1990 1994 
Australia 4.6 2.9 3.1 2.1 
Canada 2.0 2.4 2.7 2.4 
France 2.5 1.9 1.2 0.8 
Germany 4.7 3.2 2.4 1.9 
Ireland -0.6 -0.2 0.2 0.4 
Italy 0.1 0.5 1.8 2.5 
Japan 4.2 4.6 4.4 4.4 
Spain 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.0 
United Kingdom -0.5 1.1 1.7 1.7 
United States 2.0 1.6 2.0 2.2 
     
Average 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.0 
Source: Chennells and Griffith (1997).   
See notes to Table 12.  
 
 There have been numerous proposals for ways in which these tax-induced biases in 
investment can be ameliorated or even eliminated (see, for example, IFS Capital Taxes 
Group, 1992).  Given the concern about the impact of investment on economic growth, it would be 
surprising if the next decade did not see reforms in this area.   
  
XVI. Globalisation 
 Globalisation is not new, but the pace of integration of national economies has quickened.  
The development of regional trading blocs — such as the EU and NAFTA — the removal of 
restrictions on investment flows and improved communications technology have accentuated the 
trends.  The implications for tax policy have been, and will continue to be enormous.   
 Globalisation has increased the geographical mobility of capital.  The benefits to the 
world economy are clear: the international allocation of savings and capital are improved, 
improving firms‟ incentives to invest.  This in turn enhances opportunities for labour, with 
increased productivity leading to higher output and wages.  The tax base has become more mobile, 
and business decisions like investment and financing are therefore more sensitive to tax 
differentials between countries.  This means that high tax rates on capital are no longer feasible, 
which is perhaps responsible for some of the cuts in corporate tax revenues shown in Table 2 and 
the falling company tax rates.  Some countries have also seen erosion of the capital income tax 
base.   
 Economic integration could put pressure on other tax bases.  Cross-border shopping puts 
pressure on differentials in excise and VAT rates.  Denmark and Canada have been forced to cut 
alcohol and tobacco taxes in response.  The European Union has imposed minimum excise duty 
and VAT rates to ameliorate this problem, but countries with particularly high rates will continue to 
have problems.  The concern again here is that tax competition for cross-border shopping will 
result in lower tax rates, another example of an eroding tax base.   
 Perhaps the most important new development for tax policy is new communications 
technology.  The Internet, in particular, is creating a global „information superhighway‟ which will 
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revolutionise business more quickly than previous technical advances.  As technological change 
weakens the links between economic activity and a particular location, traditional tax concepts, 
such as „residency‟ and „source‟ become difficult to apply.  Fiscal residency is usually decided on 
criteria such as physical presence, incorporation and place of effective control.  But management 
and control of services provided over the information superhighway are difficult to determine.  
Communications now allow distant groups of people to collaborate in new ways: for example, 
global securities dealing and scientific projects.  Allocating the profits and losses of these activities 
to different countries is a problem for tax authorities.  The Internet also allows entrepreneurs to 
extend the services they can offer abroad without the need to set up a physical presence in that 
country.   
 As the Internet becomes more commercialised, a parallel banking and payment system 
becomes a distinct possibility.  A new system is needed to allow tax authorities to identify when 
and where taxable activities are carried out, including access, record-keeping and reporting 
requirements.  Anonymity and encryption built into these systems need to balance consumers‟ 
requirements of confidentiality with the needs of tax administrations.   
 
XVII. Conclusions  
 Tax systems have evolved continuously as a result of economic, social and political 
pressures ever since the introduction of something like the modern personal income tax in the 18
th
 
century.  The main theme of the history of taxation is the continual search for sources of revenue 
with the inexorable growth of the public sector throughout the 20
th
 century.  Traditional sources of 
revenue, such as excises and the personal income tax, were complemented with new taxes, such as 
social security contributions and VAT.  The growth of taxation has not been reversed in the 1980s 
and 1990s, despite efforts to „roll back the frontiers of the state‟ in many countries.  The rate of 
growth, however, has slowed.   
 Tax systems have evolved in response to a number of social, economic and political 
pressures.  For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s one of the main issues was the operation of 
the tax system in an inflationary world.  „Fiscal drag‟ became a big problem: increases in nominal 
income increased the tax burden on individuals as inflation eroded the value of credits and 
allowances and pushed people into higher tax brackets.  Automatic indexation of tax schedules was 
adopted in 15 OECD countries.  Companies, too, faced higher taxes as illusory, inflationary 
increases in the nominal value of inventories were taxed.  Capital gains taxes became punitive 
when nominal gains were taxed.  Indexation procedures were introduced to deal with these 
problems.  The outlook for inflation is now more benign, but other economic issues, such as 
growth and jobs, will continue to dominate the tax reform agenda.   
 This paper has shown that tax systems changed markedly in the 1980s and 1990s.  Top 
rates of personal income tax and rates of corporate income tax fell, but the bases of these taxes were 
broadened.  VAT spread to more countries and the rate of the tax tended to increase.  Social 
security contributions continued to rise.  The objectives of tax reforms varied, but tended to include 
economic efficiency, moving towards a more neutral system and reducing the highest marginal tax 
rates, simplification and transparency.  Some reforms were designed to raise additional revenue.  
 The analysis of the reforms shows that there is much unfinished business.  While the 
taxation of savings and investment has moved towards neutrality, significant distortions remain 
because of the tax treatment of different assets and different sources of business finance.  
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Moreover, tax reforms have had undesirable effects on the tax burden on labour and on the 
distribution of income.   
 A range of social, economic and political pressures will shape the future of tax reform.  
Ageing populations and changing demographic patterns, such as growing numbers of lone parents 
will affect government‟s revenue requirements.  On the economic front, internationalisation will 
be an important force, with the growth of multinational and regional trading blocs, such as the EU 
and NAFTA, and the importance of the communications revolution.  Governments‟ response will 
be greater use of international fora, such as the OECD and EU investigations of harmful tax 
competition.  EU integration and the completion of the single currency project mean that Member 
states and the Commission are likely to return to the issue of tax harmonisation.  Within countries, 
there may be demand for greater regional autonomy in taxation, for example, in Catalonia, Quebec 
and Scotland and the „states‟ rights‟ movement in the United States.   
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